Constitutional Engineering 101

Last semester I designed a little “constitutional engineering” exercise for comparative politics. It’s probably better for a special topics course. Fortunately, I’m teaching just such a course this semester: Democracy & Democratization.

The simulation is rather simple. I designed a “Country Report” about a country (the Land of Oz). Students are then assigned into teams and asked to jointly write a 5-6 page policy brief recommending a constitutional design for a democratic Oz. After spending several weeks discussing issues of democratic theory, democratization, and constitutional design (presidentialism vs. parliamentarism, different kinds of electoral systems, issues of federalism, etc.) they should have enough from which to formulate a basic framework. The purpose is to test their ability to apply their readings to a “real” case (in this case, an imaginary one).

Heiss & Navia on constitutional reforms in Chile

Abstract: Chile’s 1989 constitutional reforms constituted a trade-off: the military gave up protected democracy provisions but acquired greater autonomy. The democratic opposition could accept or reject, but not modify, constitutional changes proposed by the outgoing dictatorship. This study addresses a very limited time period in the transition to democracy: the moment after the transition has been secured and transitional rules have been established. The dynamics of this period differ markedly from those in the larger democratic transition. The approach in this study complements alternative explanations of why the 1989 reforms benefited the outgoing dictatorship more than the incoming democratic government. Although the outgoing regime granted several opposition demands by reducing restrictions on political pluralism and eliminating barriers to political party activity, it also secured provisions that made the military more independent of civilian authorities than originally conceived in the 1980 Constitution.

Claudio Hess and Patricio Navia (2007), “You Win Some, You Lose Some: Constitutional Reforms in Chile's Transition to Democracy,” Latin American Politics & Society 49 (3): 163-190.